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The Ethiopian Election of 2005: A Bombshell & Turning Point?
Abdi Ismail Samatar
University of Minnesota
September 09, 2005
Introduction
Ethiopia 's parliamentary election in May 2005 was a spectacular event in the country's political annals as the opposition captured at least a third of the parliamentary seats. Two competing interpretations aimed at assessing the significance of the results have emerged. One scenario posits that international pressure has finally forced the regime to relax some of its controls on the political process and permit democratic expression of views. An amalgam of ethnicist opposition forces, many international institutions that supported and monitored the election, and others have endorsed this proposition. A second submission asserts that the political strategy TPLF-dominated regime pursued, which allowed different ethnic communities to govern themselves within the context of the federal constitution, is slowly but steadily maturing.
This, most recent election, they allege, has vindicated the government's efforts during the past decade. Hence, the Ethiopian Prime Minister's declaration that he “is proud to have introduced democracy to Ethiopia .” Both theses contain important elements of truth, however, they fail to grasp the event's significance for the future in the context of the country's oppressive and sectarian political history. We, therefore, propose an alternative explication that recognizes the outcome as an important milestone towards a democratic political order, but which underscores how the confluence of disagreeable but opportunistic opposition forces could possibly lead to a political cul de sac. These contradictory forces derive from the legacy of the assimilationist ethnic politics of the Amhara-dominated regimes and those induced by the Tigray led government since 1992. How the conflicting agendas of the various political-ethnic groups are recast in the new electoral context shall determine whether 2005 marks: (a) Ethiopia's emergence as a democratic and civic polity; (b) as another attempt by the regime to hold on to power through illegitimate gimmicks; (c) as a way for chauvinist opposition to re-impose the dead order; (d) other sectarian elites to further fragment the social fabric. All three latter courses will invariably prolong current violence and instigate a new civil war that might lead to the break up of the country into “ethnic” fiefdoms.
We tender that this electoral opening is an opportunity to embark on the difficult task of re-building the political fabric of the country and caution that chauvinist elements of the opposition intend to reverse the course of history by erasing “ethnic politics” in Ethiopia through the re-imposition of the old imperial identity. Such an attempt will trigger a new wave of violence as communities will resist their re-colonization. Further, other elements in the opposition dream of creating their ethnic Bantustans in which the “natives” are free from Abysinian dominance and will return to their original state. This illusion, even if it transpires, will merely relocate the conflicts within groups as we have already witnessed in Ethiopia since 1992. The vital question which this brief essay will explore is how might the election results be turned into an opportunity to initiate a civic and democratic beginning for Ethiopia ? The rest of the essay is divided into three parts. Part one briefly identifies two contrasting political reconstruction strategies in Africa that have similar objectives (democracy/justice), at least in appearance, but different means of achieving them. A key factor that distinguishes the two strategies is the way in which they treat cultural and political identity. Part two is a short summary of how the promise of 1991 in Ethiopia turned into a dead end. Finally, the conclusion assesses the prospect of transforming the 2005 election into an opportunity to embark on a civic journey.
Contrasting Political Strategies: Ethnic versus Civic
In the 1990s in Africa two sharply contrasting models of state-society relations and the role of ethnicity in national affairs have emerged: namely ethnic and civic. The first is what we call the ethnic road to political reconstruction. This approach deems ethnicity as the over-ridding form of identity among the population that can not be ignored in public affairs. Proponents argue that ethnicity has been a central factor in public life, usually since a particular ethnic group colonized the state and subjugated other communities. In such circumstance, the dominant group denied the importance of the ethnic factor and castigated dissident communities for being sectarian. Prime Minister Zenawi articulated this position and noted that Africa 's ethnic reality could be ignored at our peril.
…
eople in Africa feel that they can wish away ethnic difference. Experience in Rwanda has taught us this is not the case. Experience in Liberia has taught us that this is not the case. What we are trying to do in Ethiopia is to recognize thatethnic differences are part of life in Africa , and try to deal with them in a rational manner. Rather than hide the fact that we have ethnic difference, we are saying people should express it freely. That, I think, pre-empts the type of implosion we've had in Rwanda .
Zenawi's statement essentializes and homogenizes ethnicity and the specificity of his articulation creates a quandary: acknowledge its existence or deny it. It is argued that denying or suppressing ethnic identity has had calamitous social, political, and economic repercussions. Consequently, advocates of the strategy imagine that one of Africa 's major political riddles could be solved by anchoring citizenship in the soil of ethnic belonging. Ethiopia chose the ethnic road to political reconstruction as a means of depoliticizing ethnicity in the long run.
The civic road to reconstruction differentiates between two types of ethnic identities. First, there exists a non-state centric tradition based on shared values that are not legally defined. An alternative to such identity is one sanctioned by the state and which is therefore enforceable. Recognizing these two identity forms create the opportunity to overcome the dilemma posed by the Ethiopian Prime Minister. Thus, to acknowledge the first form of ethnicity does not necessarily mean to endorse the second. Distinguishing these identity variants is necessary but insufficient to understand how old cultural traditions became political instruments of the state. To grasp the origins and nature of cultural identity's metamorphosis one needs to re-examine colonial state formation in Africa.
…colonial powers were the first fundamentalists of the modern period. They were the first to advance and put into practice two propositions: one, that every colonized group has an original and pure tradition, whether religious or ethnic; and two, that every colonized group must be made to return to that original condition, and that return must be enforced by law. Put together, these two propositions constitute the basic platform of every religious or ethnic fundamentalism in the ostcolonial world.
The creation and development of the colonial state distorted older cultural traditions and turned them into instruments that served the dominant forces. It is this colonial reinvention of tradition that is at the heart of contemporary ethnic/political problems in the continent, including Ethiopia . State imposed Amhara language and culture –defining Ethiopianess- and the denial of other communities' political and economic rights characterized Ethiopia 's colonial form. The civic approach to reconstruction recognizes the existence of cultural differences among the African population and acknowledges the damage done by ethnic forms of cultural politics. However, it insists that accepting political ethnicity as an old African tradition reinforces the legacy of colonialism rather than inspiring a common citizenship. South Africa is the most recent example of an African country that accepts cultural difference without confounding such identity with state politics.
Divergent historical experiences shaped recent developments in South Africa and Ethiopia . Two qualities of the liberation and resistance movements in the two nations brought about different political outcomes. First, the political leadership in South Africa that made the termination of the old regime possible did not come from a single ethnic group or region and had wide public support across the country. In contrast, the core members of the Ethiopian leadership lacked legitimate representatives from non-Tigray regions and therefore could not claim popular support in most parts of the nation. Second, the military wing dominated the Ethiopian movement and determined the political outcome of post-war transformation. TPLF military became the national defense force and consequently enforced the party's political agenda rather than provide the basis for political consensus. On the contrary, South Africa 's defense force which failed to defeat the liberation movement remained intact. The compromise between the leaders of the apartheid regime and the liberation movement confirmed the military's neutrality in the political process. Consequently, the ANC led national unity government embarked on a gradual process of military reform and reintegration in order to insure the integrity of the force. Further, the split between the new political leadership and the old military made it improbable for the post-apartheid regime to use the defense force to intimidate other parties to accept its political agenda. A critical analysis of the genesis of political ethnicity and the reform agencies involved is essential in order to figure out effective ways of terminating the legacy of “divide and rule.”
Ethiopia and the Ethnic Road
In the early 1990s Ethiopia embarked on a seemingly novel political project that divided the country into nine “ethnic provinces.” The presumed rational for this political strategy was to overcome the imposition of Amhara culture and language on Oromos, Somalis, Afars, the people of the southern region, etc., and the denial of their cultural heritage through state control. The challenge of post-1991 was how to undo past subjugations without reifying cultural differences through politics.
Before exploring what became of the challenge, it is imperative to know why TPLF choose the ethnic road? Three crucial objective conditions which TPLF faced necessitated its strategic choice. First, TPLF needed to gain some degree of legitimacy for the new regime with non-Tigray populations. Establishing ethnic provinces seemed the most visible route to accomplish this goal since it dovetailed with the party's ethnic orientation. Second, the party's leadership appreciated the depth of injustice visited on non-Amhara populations. Consequently, it was predisposed to experiment with a political system that could have immediate resonance with various ethnic groups, but which could also focus attention away from the center during those crucial early days of the transition. Finally and most significantly, TPLF came to power through the barrel of the gun and like all such organizations desired to maintain itself in power at whatever cost. Senior party strategists considered the establishment of ethnic regions as a vehicle to engage ethnic leaders in ways that would reduce their challenge to TPLF dominance at the national level.
The interplay between these three factors circumscribed the dynamics of the ethnic political order and its resourcefulness to respond to local and national imperatives. It is worth remembering that ethnic federalism was meant to restore cultural dignity to local communities and grant them greater autonomy to mind their affairs, such as electing their regional and federal representatives. If steady progress has been made on these two vital arenas one could legitimately argue that the ethnic instrument might lead to a civic outcome. Enough evidence has accumulated over the past fourteen years to gauge how much progress has been made and the prospects for future development.
Re-drawing the administrative regions of Ethiopia along ethnic lines had some immediate and apparent benefits for communities who were previously marginalized, demonized, or whose existence was denied. The declaration of Oromo, Somali and others regions finally put an end to decades of suppression and denial of these communities' rights. For instances, former Amhara regimes deprived Oromos, who are the largest language group in the country, of the right to express themselves in their mother tongue in public spaces. These regimes went the extra mile to systematically destroy cultural traditions of the Oromos and many other communities in order to naturalize their vision of Amharanized Ethiopia. The Country's development since 1991 was a dagger at the heart of this chauvinist ethnic project. One of the major benefits of the new order was the establishment of script for many languages and their use as medium of instruction in regional primary schools. This single act has liberated various communities from Amhara cultural tyranny and has enabled children from non-Amhara regions to gain confidence and relish their heritage for the first time in recent history. It also demystified cultural basis of political domination. Recognizing this type of cultural diversity was a vital step in disconnecting political ethnicity from cultural identity and was therefore an essential step towards the creation of civic order. However the success of the cultural element of the new dispensation has been blemished by federal authorities who dictate the type of official history taught in schools and sectarian regionalists who distort history to legitimate their ethnic political project. In spite of these shortcomings, most reforms in the cultural/educational field have been relatively successful despite the limitations noted above.
The political reform program has been the Achilles heel of the new order. Vital elements of federal dispensation were presumably established to allow regional communities manage their local affairs, and have the freedom to elect their leaders and hold them accountable. Local autonomy and democracy was intended to erase the legacy of ethnic-based political privileges to the extent that the constitution sanctions a region's right to secede from the federation. Given these new constitutionally endorsed rights, two issues deeply worried TPLF leadership. First, they were concerned about some regions opting for independence given their deep sense of alienation from the center. Second, they assumed that if regional elections were free and fair, particularly in Oromia, an opposition party might come to power which could easily challenge TPLF dominance. The combination of TPLF's need to support the restoration of human rights of grieved communities and maintain itself in power dictated its policies in the regions. Driven by this compulsion, it created liberation organization for other groups, the so-called PDOs, even before it captured Addis Ababa . The first ominous sign of TPLF's modus operandi was the expulsion of Oromo Liberation Front from the transition.
TPLF's instrumentalist political agenda and practice contradicted the rhetoric of liberation and regional development. The PDOs which the Tigray party spawned won provincial elections in 1992 and dominated federal parliament ever since. Two subsequent elections reconfirmed a new pattern of supremacy in which TPLF held all organs of political and military power. Such manufacture of puppet parties beholden to federal authorities and pseudo-elections doubly undermined regional autonomy from the center and accountability of leaders to their communities. TPLF's practice to unseat and appoint any regional authority at will has completely alienated the public from the system of governance, and has turned local authorities into sycophants who serve their masters and themselves. The dominant federal party's obsession with retaining power in spite of its narrow popular base has deprived the country of an opportunity to gain a civic footing, and has unnecessarily heightened ethnic political identity.
Ethiopia 's pretentious ethnic democracy could not be sustained for long without the heavy hand of the security forces. The international community's pressure on the regime to open up the political process finally had the desired effect of relaxing political controls, mainly in urban areas. A significant proportion of the estranged public took advantage of the opportunity to vent its displeasure by voting against TPLF and the most recent ethnic hierarchy, and for an opposition led by chauvinists who are wedded to the old oppressive order.
A Last Chance for a Civic Coalition
High voter turnout and the results of the election clearly demonstrate that a significant proportion of the population is dissatisfied with the policies and practices of the regime. Some elements of the opposition who have campaigned on hideously sectarian platforms have misconstrued the outcome as an endorsement for their agenda which is to undo the federation and reinvent the former empire. Progressive groups' interpretation of the election results is at variances with the above and point out that most of the public voted not to undo the progress of the past decade, but to punish TPLF, and underscore the need to shift course and return to the spirit of the early 1990s. Although TPLF dominated coalition seem to have “won” a majority of seats in parliament, many of the MPs are PDO members who lack legitimacy and therefore do not have the strength to serve the people they contend to represent. Therefore, continued alliance of TPLF and PDOs can only reinforce the cynicism that has sapped the confidence of the positive spirit which the regionalization of the administration motivated.
Since neither the prolongation of the present condition nor a return to Amhara dominated Ethiopia is desirable or feasible, what options might exist to turn the regime's crisis into a national opportunity, and how could that be realized? The first declaration to make is that elements of the opposition who campaigned on exclusivist platforms can not inspire confidence among the majority of the population. Thus, only progressive members, including many regional nationalist, of the opposition have a fleeting opportunity to lead the civic movement no matter what political arrangement is made to resolve election results. The first step in such an endeavor is to convene regional civic conferences wherein communities can articulate their thoughts about the way forward for the Ethiopian federation and select their civic leaders. Subsequently, leaders from all regions can organize to form the national civic forum which will synthesize contributions from the regions into a national document. The proposed forum differs from the national conference which TPLF convened in 1991 as communities will have greater freedom to set the agenda and select their representatives without external intervention. One goalpost that ought to guide the new civic alliance is: regional autonomy within a civic federation.
The progressive opposition has an advantage over others in instigating the movement, since it has not been tainted by the old practices of divide and rule. However, it does not have a monopoly on exploring the civic road, and the challenge is how to build a representative civic fabric. TPLF, by contrast, has been damaged by its strategy of political manipulation and coercion, and the outcome of the election has taught it a sobering political lesson, that is it could not expect its humiliated partners to come to its rescue at the hour of its need. In spite of recent turn of events many of those who voted for the opposition are weary of the chauvinists' return to power and might entertain a new contract with the government. This could mean some of the credit TPLF had with communities could possibly be salvaged. In order for the Party to regain some degree of trust with non-Tigray communities, individual leaders and the party must be ready to take the real risk of losing power. The first step in its rehabilitation is to candidly admit its past misdeeds, publicly commit itself to a new dispensation in which the security forces will not interfere with the political process, and consequently create an independent body to which the military and police forces are accountable. Further, it will have to acquiesce to new freedoms in which communities openly debate their affairs and elect their representatives without constraint. Only such a radical scheme from its Orwellian “all animals are created equal but some are more equal than others” has a chance to restore some degree of credibility to the party and inspire the public.
Given the variety of ways of orchestrating a democratic future, here are four real possibilities in Ethiopia . First, the governing party can bury its head in the sand and continue to intimidate the public in order to hang on to power. Such a strategy is destined to fail. The only way a coalition with TPLF can have a life span longer than the next five years in a democratically inclined Ethiopia is to undertake a transparent and serious analysis of what is wrong with the ethnic formula and why did the voters reject the party that liberated the country from a fascist dictatorship? Such re-assessment must be qualitatively different from past gimgemes in which certain groups had the privilege to scrutinize the “wrong” doings of underprivileged groups. Endorsing this approach does not guarantee TPLF's continued dominance but it will give the country the chance to build on the progressive contributions made in the early 1990s and transcend political ethnicity. Second, the chauvinist opposition could aim to seize power using massive street demonstration in Addis Ababa in order to reinvent Amhara dominance over three-quarter of the national population who is non-Amhara. This strategy has no civic future and will also lead to a dead-end. Third, the progressive elements of the opposition from various regions have an occasion to embark on the creation of a national civic movement which is respectful of cultural differences among the population, but that does not ossify it into state sanctioned political identity. Establishing such a movement will require incredible dedication and good faith, an uncommon feature of Ethiopian politics. One of the key challenges for such a movement is how to build trust among a new generation of leaders that are genuinely representative. Creating such a movement is the most exigent route but could also be the most promising avenue to a civic future. Finally, a combination of circumstances driven by current political pressures might lead to a calamitous end. A cunning but dishonest TPLF remains dominant, an opposition that is driven by the tribal haughtiness or lust for power, and a disorganized public alienated from national politics could usher the end of Ethiopia as one country. This is the nature of the crossroads which the 2005 election signifies: reject ethnic chauvinism, respect cultural differences, and nurture a just civic federation, or perish.
Notes
Previous opportunities for civic reconstruction were wasted, including 1974, 1991.
The opposition mainly consists of two groups: chauvinists led by the Amhara elite and regional nationalists. The regional nationalist can be divided into two main groups: civic and sectarian nationalists.
We might never know the exact number of seats won legitimately by the opposition or the government party.
Zenawi, M. Zenawi, Quoted in Steven P. Tucker, Ethiopia in Transition, 1991-1998. Unpublished manuscript. For a contrasting reading of Rwanda , See Mamdani, M. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Genocide in Rwanda ( Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2001).
Mamdani, M. Race and Ethnicity as Political Identity in the African Context. In Nadia Tazi (ed.) Keywords: Identity ( New York : Other Press. 2004), 1-24.
Ibid. p. 6.
Colonialism in Ethiopia meant the supremacy of the Amhara and the conquest and subjugation of non-Abysinian cultural group such as the Oromo, Somalis, Afar, Gambella, and many others.
For an interesting analysis of the military see, Luckman, R. Radical Soldiers, New Army Models and the Nation State in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Draft Paper.
Samatar, A. I. “Ethiopian Federalism: Autonomy versus Control in the S
