Corruption, disinformation and duplicity,
inalienable elements of treason

Treasons of this scale and persistence for over a
decade cannot be isolated incidents of a transient
nature. Crime of treason is rather modus operandi of
EPRDF’s conduct of government. The regime makes use of
the nation’s wealth to conduct crimes of treason with
debilitating consequences. Its habitual crimes are
contrary to what must be a government’s duty of nation
building. Corruption, duplicity and disinformation are
distinguishing characteristics of EPRDF’s government
intertwined with the works of its crimes.

Corruption and treason are corollaries of the decadent
administration pervasive of more or less all levels of
government and institutions. They are well entrenched
in EPRDF’s own affiliate ethnic parties and mass
organizations, including the diplomatic core, the
bureaucracy, the security, the national defense, etc.
The treasonous system of government, though a unique
political phenomenon born to Ethiopia’s decades of
adverse political development, is proven by the
nihilist ideologues in the EPRDF to be a viable system
of government, like fascism, communism, and Nazism are
in their own way. The viability of the treasonous
system of government is not contingent upon political
repression alone; ethnic politics, akin to treason in
many ways, perpetuated treason as a political system.
Ethnic politics as a manifestation of a dissolute form
of political _expression by the public is inevitably
exploited by the regime for its destructive purposes.

Boston University developed Control of Corruption
Index where Ethiopia scored –0.35 in the year 2002.
The study uses index ranging between the highest point
2.5 and the lowest –2.5. Corruption takes purely an
economic and cultural connotation when applying an
index to measure good governance among countries of
the world. Corruption for the EPRDF administration,
however, has political significance, making it a
promotional item due to the special component of
treason. EPRDF leaders are seen encouraging corruption
overtly, and not controlling it, as the above index
would suggest of a legitimate government; they also
use corruption as a double-edged sword in the name of
combating corruption to implicate their political
opponents on false corruption charges. Prime Minister
Meles Zienawi committed a crime far beyond corrupting
his political power when he drafted a bill overnight
to put to prison his accusers of treason like the
former Defense Minister Siye Abreha.

The EPRDF encourages corruption, embezzlement of
public funds, and unethical practices in state
administration for the following two reasons: one, it
employs corruption to blemish the integrity and
practice of public service thereby eroding the
contractual relations between the state and the
people. The delivery of quality government amenities
that took root since the time of Emperor Haileselasie,
the school system, the army and police, justice
system, etc are at their lowest standard; and two, as
an indispensable part of treason, EPRDF has made
corruption attractive to the bureaucracy and to all
those who can send their hands into it by corrupting
the police and court system. Acclimatized as a normal
practice, corruption has been instrumental in
sustaining the EPRDF. It helped it to minimize or
neutralize the political impact of treason arising
from the army or even the bureaucracy. Corruption and
fraudulent administrative practice also helps the
EPRDF to conceal evidences of treason as in the
example of one major case where the leaders arranged
the illegal transfer of funds in the tune of two
billion Birr to Eritrea prior to the war; the same
would be true for the embezzlement of national wealth
in the billions of dollars to foreign personal
accounts.

Manipulation of information has become a treacherous
undertaking that can afflict vulnerable states in
today’s world. Specially handled information on
non-existent Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq by
the Bush Administration was sufficient enough to rally
public support and start the war against Sadam.

The EPRDF by its treasonous nature is well adept to
deceitful use of information in facilitating its
crimes. It never refrained from fabricating
information to mislead or influence public opinion in
an attempt to execute its objectionable policies. The
blatant use of deceptive information is transformed
into coercion when eventually met by strong public
opposition as in the border fiasco.

The use of information has an instantaneous global
reach with the advent of the Internet. Western nations
with their colossal news networks use information to
sway global politics in their interest and often
against the interest of the weaker nations in an
intrusive and interventionist terms. It is no
coincidence that the EPRDF finds the Western media an
indispensable collaborator in blackmailing Ethiopia
using skewed information. For instance, Western news
coverage of the border war was explicitly directed at
weakening Ethiopia’s position creating tremendous
pressure on the Ethiopian people to accept the
agreement. Information is used as an instrument of
foreign policy to infringe on national sovereignty of
countries like Ethiopia since the paradigm shift in
global politics after the cold war.

Falsification of facts for ethnic consumption is
another equally daunting problem showing abuse of
information. Misrepresentation of ethnic issues is one
known reason that has created a barrier on open
dialogue between ethnic groups. The insinuation of
false information on development initiatives by the
EPRDF in Tigray, for example, is extremely common
among other ethnic groups. It is expressed in the
following malicious manner: “the province of Tigray is
sinking from property overload looted from the rest of
Ethiopia”. This communication pattern is an upshot of
corrupt government policies for the last century where
the state either granted or denied development
opportunities according to ethnicity. The public’s
view of development is something that is dealt out by
the state based on its ethnic orientation and not a
free enterprise left to the endeavor of all Ethiopians
according to their entrepreneurial merits and
potential where the state should play a secondary role
fostering it.

The relative freedom of expression in Ethiopia that
came at a heavy cost to the Ethiopian people is
wrongly accredited to the EPRDF. Informational
blackout sanctioned by the EPRDF in Ethiopia today
marks a deep ethnic divide in information gap.
Ethiopians have very little means of learning what
actually goes on from one end of the country to
another, for instance from Welega to Mekelle to be
able to reach a political consensus on matters of
national interest contrary to the rumors that feed
into the divisive ethnic politics. Hence, the fight
against EPRDF’s incursions into what is left of the
freedom of _expression in the smallest segment of the
country, i.e. Addis Ababa is a precarious one. On the
other hand, the lack of sincerity on part of the local
private media concentrated in the capital is partly to
blame for promulgating ethnic politics.

One of the most intractable problems of ethnic
politics is that it obstructs openness in information
exchange that could enhance national unity and
political consensus as a solution to the political
crisis posed by the EPRDF. There cannot be a unified
political front to combat the regime without open
dialogue to solving political problems. The real
motive behind the crime of treason is one that as
fallen prey to ethnic categorization stipulated the
main reason for the crimes. The quest for the root
causes of treason is a lost cause as long as the
self-defeating ethnic politics continues to dump
EPRDF’s crimes in unlikely places. One would think
that the there would not be controversy over the
motives for treason since EPRDF’s crimes of treason
transcend ethnic politics. The misguided public
perception about the EPRDF being an ethnic dominance
is in essence self-serving when the other
organizations also part to the crimes are deliberately
ignored. It is even cowardly to remove these parties
from the crime seen for the purpose of vilifying one
ethnic group. This no doubt will alienate Tigary in
the long run from the national political movement
unless the opposition parties and the public alleviate
this problem by encouraging the culture of openness
and constructive use of information in the local
media.

IV. Motives for treason

TPLF’s military agility and tremendous success over
the Dergue was often interpreted as an indication of
its political maturity and independence. Contrary to
popular believes, the TPLF was unable to acquire
political maturity or independence once it submitted
to the mentorship of the more powerful and senior EPLF
in the 1970s; “After the Tigray National Organization
accepted the EPLF’s view that Eritrea was a colony and
therefore had a right to secede from Ethiopia, they
were promised support” writes John Young (Young, J.
1997 p. 85) A strategic issue of national sovereignty
was negotiated for material gains of trivial nature by
the TNO (the precursor of the TPLF). The EPLF wasted
no time taking control of the TPLF by implanting its
agents in key positions. The EPRP getting into the
same quagmire in its infancy with the EPLF (still
inexcusable for its treasonous implications) later
retracted its policy on the independence of Eritrea.
TPLF leaders on the contrary expedited the separation
of Eritrea. The TPLF, in other words the people of
Tigray, were made to pay heavy price in terms of human
and material cost to make Eritrea’s separation a
reality.

The current Prime Minister who embarked with a group
supposedly to form the TPLF eluded the group and was
missing for some time until he run into a couple of
his colleagues in Eritrea. (Abiy Araia, July 2001). He
is suspected that he picked up even more radicalized
anti-Ethiopian views and a mission with political
backing from the EPLF when he returned to the TPLF in
1976 after a prolonged stay in Eritrea. It comes too
late even for Aregawi Berhe (a former leader of the
TPLF later to be thrown out by Meles himself) to save
his career with the organization. Aregawi’s remark
also underlines the same suspicion about Meles’
mysterious disappearance; “… the mystery of his
unexplained absence continues to hung over Meles.”
(Aregawi Berhe, 2004 p.587).

Meles carried out numerous purges as he worked his way
up to the top leadership. Successfully outmaneuvering
and defeating his opponents over the years, he
followed a stringent policy of recruiting people of
Eritrean lineage or who believed in Eritrean
independence to his squad of cadres whose loyalty to
him proved decisive during the infighting in the TPLF
leadership. The Eritrean and Ethiopian mixed parentage
helped the anti-Ethiopian elements in the TPLF to work
for Eritrean independence masquerading themselves as
Tigrean nationalists. They cunningly used Tigrean
nationalist fervor and repugnance to the Dergue to
their advantage.

Infatuated by ELF/EPLF’s creation of new identity
suited for a would be modern Eritrean state,
antithetic to the cultural history of Ethiopia, TPLF
leaders with Eritrean connections are emotionally
attached to Eritrean nationalism of its colonial
history. They are disciples of a school of thought
created by the ELF and EPLF that spent a good portion
of three decades warping Eritrea’s historical and
cultural identity. The postcolonial generation lacked
a historical point of reference to place Eritrea in a
historical context before and after the colonial
period except for the Eritrean mythology created by
the movement. It is led to believe that colonialism is
the most favourable historical incident that has
shaped Eritrea in body and soul. It is this historical
perspective of the EPLF that sets Eritrea apart from
Ethiopia engendering it with the only necessary
condition to establish itself as an independent state.
The separatist and anti-Ethiopian sentiment, no doubt,
has also shaped Meles’ identity constantly pulling him
towards Eritrea. While he expressly shown his disdain
for Ethiopians and their country, at the same time, he
managed to put the issue of his partly Eritrean
heritage out of bound for discussion as the source of
his conflict of interest and the root cause for his
crimes of treason.

Tekeste Negash provides historical evidence that will
help shade light on the continued saga of
understanding the enigmatic psyche of the postcolonial
Eritrean generation that defied any rational
explanation to its destructive aspects: “From the
mid-1930s a combination of three factors further
contributed towards the evolution of what may rightly
be called the Eritrean consciousness. The first was
the growing racist ideology which began to draw a
distinction between the Eritreans who were fortunate
enough to be under the civilizing umbrella of Italy
and the inhabitants of the Ethiopian empire. This
policy, though devised to bolster Italian imperial or
colonial ego, appeared to have trickled down to the
Eritrean literati. The language of many Eritrean
politicians in the 1940s betrays the pervasiveness of
the colonial racist ideology of the 1930s.” (Tekeste
Negash, 1996 p.16)

The other motive for TPLF leaders crimes of treason is
forming the republic of Tigray. Aregawi Berhe speaks
of Meles zienawi, Sibhat Nega, Siyoum Mesfin and Abay
Tsehaye as the ‘ultra-nationalist’ group who drafted
the 1976 manifesto of the TPLF stipulating the
establishment of an independent republic of Tigray.
(Aregawi Berhe, 2004 p.591). Again, in spite of public
outrage and strong opposition it generated from the
ranks and files of the TPLF at the time, the leaders
never renounced their secret agenda of separation
publicly, nor was it made available for discussion
within the organization. Even though the argument of
separation could have more credence in terms of
Tigrean nationalism years ago, there still are
separatist elements within the TPLF who did not
abandon their separatist dream. The separation agenda
for Tigray like the Oromo case plays well into the
hands of Eritrea to reduce Ethiopia into a fragmented
and weaker state easy to deal with. Any of the crises
Ethiopia is facing today could easily render it a
failed state (which is only steps away from becoming
one) leading to its disintegration.

It may seem ironic at the time but the idea of a rival
independent Tigray state did not sit well with Esayas
Afewerki of Eritrea two decades ago. He rebuked the
TPLF leaders in general for their separatist stance
and succeeded altering the political direction of the
TPLF away from Tigray independence. Esayas must have
developed an accurate assessment of Eritrea’s economy
as an independent state and what it means if Tigray
separated from Ethiopia. It would mean a complete
economic strangulation for his newly formed state
without the strategic presence of Tigray in Ethiopia
to take full advantage of the vast resources and
market. It would also be impossible to use Meles
Zienawi as Eritrean emissary in his present position
as Ethiopian Prime Minister; Esayas’ fear still came
to be true after Ethiopia curtailed all relations due
to the treasonous crimes of EPRDF leaders.

Regardless of the agreement reached between the two
leaders, the indications are that involuntary change
of political direction from separation does not entail
a change of heart in its leaders. John Young provides
firsthand testimony from one of EPRDF’s most powerful
individuals; the following is Sibhat Nega’s own words,
‘the national question is a primary question and we
doesn’t believe the unity of Ethiopia should be
pursued at all costs’. (Young, J. 1997 p.100) The
paradox in Sibhat’s statement is, however, the only
cost Ethiopians will have to pay for a united Ethiopia
is to eliminate the treasonous and divisive EPRDF
regime and guard against similar despotic regimes in
the future.

Sibhat’s response in a confrontation with one of his
opponents in the TPLF regarding the handing over of
Zalanbesa area to Eritrea in the border dispute sums
up intentions of the TPLF leaders. He sees no harm if
the territory remains with the enemy state for 20 to
30 years to come. The current state of affairs could
only confirm a transformation of their mission to a
long-term objective of slowly infringing on Ethiopia’s
sovereign existence. Contrary to implied separation of
Tigray in Sibhat’s statements, there is no benefit in
the future or at present for Tigray that could justify
the handing over of its lands to Eritrea based on its
expected separation sometime in the future. Their only
objective remains to be Eritrean expansion as a bigger
and economically much stronger state.

The more realistic motive and most pressing one for
handing over Ethiopian territories by Meles Zienawi is
to free Eritrea from its economic predicament by
allowing it to expand southwards into the mineral
rich, vast agricultural lands and fertile valleys of
Tigray and the Afar territories. It is expected that
Eritrea could alleviate part of its chronic deficit in
food production by annexing more lands from Ethiopia.
As part of the meticulously planned aggression,
Eritrean geologists and engineers held a meeting with
their counterparts from the Ethiopian side on an
investigative mission to learn the availability of
mineral and precious metals on the border areas of
Tigray weeks before the EPLF army invaded these lands.
Eritrea conducted extensive groundwork study for its
invasion on which basis it identified areas it claims
today.

Soon after independence, it became clear that
Eritrea’s inherent economic problem came to the
forefront as a major concern for the TPLF and the EPLF
leaders alike. Unwilling to accept a natural defeat
that followed the struggle for Eritrean independence,
they devised a comprehensive ploy against Ethiopia to
garner all that Eritrea needs in resources and market.
Tekeste Negash takes us back in time to the 1952
federation to discover what was true then weighs even
more for Eritrea today; “The economic reason for the
incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia was grounded in
the widespread appraisal of the period that the former
would not survive economically if granted
independence. Its dependence on Ethiopia for vital
food imports was repeatedly stressed. ” (Tekeste
Negash 1996 p.60). Albeit Eritrean mythology of
superior human potential thanks to Italian
colonialism, century later the economy becomes the
battleground for current and future relations between
Eritrea and Ethiopia. Meles zienawi in an interview to
the BBC talks candidly what his five-point peace
initiative exactly meant to Eritrea’s economic
dilemma: “The boundary issue became a problem when our
economic and political ties became a problem. So even
if we're to have a perfect resolution to the boundary
issue, unless we address the root causes - the
economic and political relationship issues - we're not
going to have sustainable peace.” (Meles Zienawi’s
interview to BBC Radio of January 19, 2005). No one
could speak for sure more than Meles himself that the
border wasn’t the reason for the conflict.

Thanks to the crimes of the EPRDF, Ethiopia’s
sovereignty is in a precarious state for the first
time since the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in the
Second World War. The election unable to solve the
political crisis by itself, nonetheless, has opened up
a venue for the opposition and the Ethiopian people to
forge a new way of resolving political crisis. Unlike
the armed insurgency that brought the EPRDF to power,
the election has provided a unique opportunity for a
united, peaceful and democratic resolution of the
crisis; and public protest is part of the democratic
right, peaceful and legal means of changing unlawful
government. No matter how the EPRDF could be violent
and ready to spill civilian blood, the election has
shown how shaky the regime has been. The peaceful
public protest that ensued the violent election has
proven that the regime could be brought to submission
with the peoples’ power. The protest prompted by taxi
drivers alone forced the shut down of government
offices and private businesses paralyzing the
administration in a couple of days. This regime has
inherent weakness like any other dictatorial regimes
making it susceptible to the peoples’ power like in
the Philippines, Ukraine, Georgia, etc. The opposition
coalitions political leadership has yet to be put to
the test if Ethiopia will come out as the clear winner
out of decades of crimes of treason and corruption for
a new political beginning.


References:

Abiy Araia, July 2001 “the rise of an Eritrean clique
from the womb of TPLF”

Aregawi Berhe, 2004 The origin of the Tigray Peoples
Liberation Front, p. 587; unpublished memoir.

Brown, M. E. 1997 Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, The
Mit Press, Cambridge.

Carter, J. “Ethiopia National Parliamentary and Local
Elections” May 19, 2005.

Chossudovsky, M. “Sowing the Seeds of Famine in
Ethiopia” The Ecologist, September 2000.

Joireman, S. 2000 Identifying Potential Ethnic
Conflict, The Ethiopian Prospective Case, Rand’s
Publication.

Looker, D. 2004 “Grain companies lobby harder for more
food aid” Successful Farming Magazine.

Meles Zienawi, January 19, 2005 BBC Radio Interview.

Tekeste Negash 1996, The Federal Experience.

Young, J. 1997 Peasant revolution in Ethiopia; The
Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975-1991, Cambridge
University Press.